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Abstract  
 
This presentation seeks to contextualise current work by makers using new technologies 
by discussing ways in which technology can be defined and the theoretical frameworks 
within which these definitions sit.  
 
It will briefly highlight some of the common ways in which we discuss technology and 
technological mediation, and relate these beliefs to particular characterisations of 
technology. This will include a 'conservative' characterisation which is often championed 
by computer scientists and technologists and based on rigidly quantifiable aspects of 
technology and its use. A 'critical' characterisation will also be briefly discussed, based on 
the work of Martin Heidegger and Tony Fry this characterisation seeks to question how 
the use of technologies mediate our experience of 'being'. 
 
A pragmatic characterisation of technology will be proposed (based to some degree on 
John Dewey's work) which considers technologies as 'extensions of man' (sic). The 
implications of this characterisation will be discussed and related to notions of 
contemporary craft practice and creativity. 
 
The conclusion will discuss the implications of taking a pragmatic position when 
considering the use of new technologies by makers and cite examples where relevant. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In this presentation I want to try and contextualise current work by makers who use 
computer technologies by discussing ways in which we can define all technologies. I will 
outline a range of different characterisations of technology and discuss the significant 
elements within each. 
 
I do not claim to be making any original insights into the nature of technological 
mediation or creative practice. However, I do hope to show that if we regard technologies 
and how they are used from a pragmatic/instrumentalist perspective this has important 
implications for how we think about craft practice and creativity. 
 
The development of this paper was instigated by a number of factors, including a 
recognition that the language used when discussing this subject can imply particular ways 
of characterising technology which I believe restricts the debate over their impact and 
significance.  
 
In discussions with makers, students and within presentations on the subject of computer 
technologies being used in creative practices I have heard expressions such as: 
'It is only a tool.' 
'It is only another means of making something.' 
'It simply allows you to do something that you could not do before.' 
'It speeds up my making process.' 
 
Such phrases may seem to be relatively innocuous. However, as I hope to show as this 
paper develops, the implications underlying their functional simplicity can restrict our 
recognition of the impact which using technologies has on our experience of the world 
and, some may argue, our very being. 
 
All these statements sit principally within one characterisation of technology, which has 
become potent and ubiquitous within western society. Its language is that of authority, 
big business and multinational high-tech industries. It has become the dominant way of 
discussing technology, almost to the point of it being considered common sense.  
It is therefore not surprising that it is often employed unconsciously by people in our 
field, especially when discussing relatively new technologies like computers. 
 
In his work on designing IT systems Richard Coyne defines this characterisation as 
conservative. He employs this expression because in terms of IT this characterisation is 
interested in the quantifiable and the conservation of measurable data, rather than any less 
concrete and rigidly definable aspects of technology. 
 
I will briefly outline some of the significant defining features of this characterisation of 
technology as a whole and then specifically discuss it in relation to computer 
technologies. 
 
I will then outline two other characterisations. Firstly the critical characterisation which 
draws significantly from Martin Heidegger's work on technology. Secondly, the 
pragmatic characterisation which draws from the work of John Dewey. It is this 
characterisation which I believe holds the greatest potential with which to fruitfully 
discuss the relationship between craft and technology. I will also attempt to draw out 
some significant parallels between what I consider to be defining features of craft 
processes and the inquiry based process of gaining new knowledge which is central to 
Dewey's pragmatic thesis. 
 
 
Conservative Characterisation of Technology 
The conservative characterisation of technology is based in a reductive scientific view of 
the world. Technologies are considered to be the application of scientific theories to real 
world situations. There is an hierarchical relationship between science and technology, 
theory and practice, and by association, the abstract and the concrete, the mental and the 
physical.  
 Reductionism proposes that knowledge is gained by dividing things up into their 
constituent parts (i.e. it is inherently fragmentary). It also seeks single causes for change 
and it aims to construct explanatory theories which can predict all the consequences of 
employing a particular technology.  
 
Not surprisingly this characterisation is common among scientists and technologists who 
use the scientific method and align themselves with the philosophical tradition of logical 
positivism. Unlike other characterisations to be discussed, conservatism and its 
positivistic outlook sees no relationship between employing technologies our being (i.e. 
how we live in and understand the world). Positivism restricts it enquiries to the things 
which can be revealed through empirical investigations.  
 
The concept of being does not fall within this realm and therefore is indefinable and 
meaningless from the conservative perspective. Therefore technologies can have no 
impact on meaningless concept. 
 
The conservative characterisation views technology as neutral and content free, therefore 
technology is not considered to make any impact on the ethos of a society or an 
individual’s ethical being. Engagement with an item of technology simply allows society 
or an individual to achieve something which was either previously impossible, or achieve 
something more efficiently than previously possible. It is a means to an end, and that is 
all. In connection with this, the concept of voluntarism, which is the idea that there are 
no good or bad technologies only the way they are used, is strong within the conservative 
characterisation. This leads to a non-ethical stance and allows technologies to be 
employed without close scrutiny or appreciation of the impact their employment is 
having on the individual or the wider society. 
 
The impact of technologies on the world are considered in terms of the directly 
quantifiable; things that can be measured in a simple direct way. Rather than recognising 
the qualitative impact of technology as well.  
 
Central to the conservative characterisation is the belief that the means of doing 
something has no impact on the ends, cause and effect are exclusive of each other. It is a 
mechanistic and mono-casual view believing in the simple process of cause and effect; 
in which one can predict the outcome of employing a particular technology in a 
particular situation. The conservative characterisation ignores the complexity of real-
world situations in which distinguishing and isolating causes and effects is often difficult, 
or even impossible.  
 
The significance of the relationship between means and ends (causes and effects) will 
become apparent as this paper develops. I hope at this stage it can be recognised how the 
statements I quoted at the start of this paper fit into this characterisation and the 
implications that they hold. 
 
From this perspective technological evolution is often considered as technological 
progress. There is a general optimistic belief that technologies will solve all our needs 
and that we are moving towards a technological utopia. This will be fundamentally 
challenged by the critical characterisation which highlights the negative aspects of 
technological mediation, both on society as a whole and on how as individuals we 
experience the world. 
 
In terms of computer technologies, the conservative characterisation is concerned with 
developing computer systems of increasing size, complexity and speed.  
The more information which can be processed and stored, the more successful and useful 
computer technologies are considered to be (bigger, better, faster). It is a characterisation 
which includes the ‘technological imperative’. This is a belief that technological 
progression is an unstoppable and irreversible process and possesses its own internal 
drive, its own imperative. Therefore what can be developed, will be developed, with no 
consideration of its appropriateness or impact on existing modes of production, types of 
living, or ways of being. 
 
Conclusion 
The conservative outlook splits theory and practice, the mental and the physical. 
Furthermore it creates hierarchy between them. This has obvious implications for 
practices such as craft, which are grounded in physical knowing and tacit knowledge. 
 
This characterisation, which seeks to quantify and systemise technology and its use, does 
not sit happily within a field such as craft which is based on individual working practices 
which are highly variable and context specific (i.e. a specific maker, in a specific 
situation engaging with the world at a particular point in time with a unique set of skills).  
 
The Critical Characterisation of technology 
In contrast to the conservative characterisation of technology is the critical view which 
looks beyond the quantitative and seeks to highlight the qualitative impact of 
technologies on individuals and society as a whole. It believes that we are conditioned by 
the technologies with which we engage and that they frame the way we experience the 
world. 
 
Like the conservative characterisation there is a belief in the technological imperative. 
However, this is not used as an argument for the taking of an amoral position, but taking 
a critical stance which challenges the utopian ideals previously stated. It is a stance that 
would regard technologies as out of control, rather than simply rapidly progressing. 
 
The critical characterisation recognises that technologies are not ethically neutral and 
value-free. Ellul insists that: 
 
“..technique carries with its own effects quite apart from how it is used. No matter 
how it is used, it has of itself a number of positive and negative consequences. This 
is not just a matter of intention.” (Ellul 1990, p.35, in Chandler 1995, p.27) 
 
This is in stark contrast to the conservative notion that technologies are simply a means to 
an end with no consequences beyond the predicted desired effects. The significance and 
impact of the technique, technology or medium through which we engage with the world 
is central to Marshall McLuhan's famous work 'The medium is the Massage' and many 
other crtical media theorists. 
 
Heidegger's Critique of Technology 
On of the most significant writers and thinkers developing ideas from this perspective 
was Martin Heidegger. I will only give a very brief outline of his critique of technology 
(techné ), but I hope this will be sufficient to provide a general feeling for his critical 
stance. 
 
His works on technology attempted to demonstrate that our experience of the world is 
‘enframed’ through technological mediations and that this restricts our ability to 
experience in the world in other ways which he believed, held the potential to reveal a 
more primal natural truths. 
 
Heidegger was concerned about the role of technology in the way we fundamentally live 
and know, in our very being. He was concerned that modern technology, instead of being 
an instrument by which elements of nature can be revealed to us, has turned nature into a 
resource to be exploited. Unlike the conservative characterisation he considers all 
technology, from the most basic to the highly complex, to be more than merely a 
functional means to an end. He considers technology to be a way in which we approach 
the world and a mode of revealing, he states that: 
 
“It is as a revealing and not as a manufacture that techné is a bringing-forth.” 
(Heidegger, in Krell 1993 p.319). 
 
Heidegger makes a definite distinction between ‘techniques of handicraft’ and ‘machine 
powered technologies’. Tools which are driven by human power or nature (e.g. wind) are 
instruments through which aspects of nature can be revealed. For example through the 
use of a hand chisel you can bring forth a wooden bowl which reveals aspects of natural 
woodiness and vesselness. Through using this tool there is a direct interaction between 
the individual and a specific natural feature. 
 
In contrast machine powered technologies involve a 'standing reserve' of energy, which 
has been extracted from nature and stored as a resource which can be controlled by man 
(e.g. electricity, oil, coal). This divorces man from nature and the 'bringing-forth' of 
handicraft becomes a 'challenging-forth' in which these technologies order and fragment 
our relationship with nature. It is this process which he entitled 'enframing'. 
 
Through using modern technologies we restrict our ability to see the world as anything 
but a resource to be used to fulfil our needs. Furthermore it is so pervasive that our ability 
to 'bring-forth' in other ways, for example through art and poiesis, is limited and he 
believes it is these modes of revealing which hold the potential to reveal more primal 
truths. 
 
This vision of technology is almost diametrically opposed to the conservative 
characterisation. While conservatism only seeks simple functional explanations of the 
impact of employing technologies, Heidegger attempts to uncover their deep 
philosophical and psychological impact on both an individual's being and society's future. 
 
Tony Fry’s critique of technology and craft 
Tony Fry is a more contemporary theorist who has published widely on issues of 
sustainability, ecology and design. His work is strongly influenced by Heidegger’s 
philosophy. Fry also recognises how engagement with the world through modern 
technologies enframe our being. He states: 
 
“Technology becomes a form of the world that stands between us and almost all 
else, it mediates the world as knowledge, image and touch. The more we see 
through system technology the less is known to our being- the body is emptied of 
spirit and the mind drained of life.” (Fry 1992, p.261) 
 
In one of his works on the nature of craft a Heideggerian perspective is also prevalent. 
Instead of trying to understand craft as a commodity or an object with particular physical 
characteristics, Fry believes craft should be considered as:  
 
“a particular way of becoming and being through the actions and consequences of 
modes of material production...craft as a textual and experiential phenomena.” (Fry 
1992, p.257)  
 
By this Fry is suggesting that craft should be considered as way of ‘being in the world’, 
(i.e. craftspeople understand/experience the world through crafting, they literally craft 
their world). He believes that craft is essentially 
 
 “...a way of being with making: the expressive being of an object that is placed 
with a genre of objects that exist to proclaim an otherness to non-human centred 
manufacture: and the expressive being of an object that is created to carry the 
signature of a maker.” (Fry 1992, p.257) 
 
As one might expect, central to Fry's conception of craft is the role hand and the 
handmade. He believes that the hand is an essential means of ‘staying in touch with the 
world’, both physically and as a mode of being in, and understanding the world. 
 
We can see how Fry's concept of craft production can be aligned to what Heidegger 
describes as ‘techniques of handicraft’ and his 'non-human centred manufacture' to 
Heidegger's ‘machine powered technology’. Fry regards the skills of an individual to be 
directly challenged by technologies which attempt to embody those skills within the 
machine itself, to automate it and so create ‘dead labour’. His concept of craft practice 
and the impact of mechanised equipment on an individual's working practices will be 
returned to and challenged in the conclusion. 
 
Conclusion 
Heidegger raises some important issues in his development of his definition of 
technology. His argument that technology is more than an instrumental tool, in the sense 
that an instrument is a value free implement which can be employed whenever 
considered appropriate with no effect on the user, is an important one. 
 
In addition, his view that technology is more than a means to an end because it involves a 
process of revealing, not just manufacturing, is significant. It lays the foundation for 
discussing the relationship between intentions and the process of making. In comparison 
with conservative characterisation, it suggests a much more creative and complex 
interplay between a technology and a user. 
 
However, it has been argued by Rothenberg (1993) that Heidegger's quest for a poetic 
(poiesis) revealing of the essential natural world, a being-in-the-world which is not 
ordered and fragmented by the lens of technological mediation; is destined for failure. 
For as we claim to know something of nature it becomes humanised and therefore 
technologised.  
 
If there is an inhuman essence to nature we will never grasp it, since the ways in which 
we reach for it are part of human techné. Our tools for understanding the world (e.g. 
language, theories, systems etc.) are all mediating technologies, we have no way of 
directly accessing an essentially natural experience. 
 
Pragmatic/Instrumentalist Characterisation of Technology 
The final characterisation to be discussed is the instrumental/pragmatic way of 
considering technology. In some ways it can be considered to philosophically lie 
somewhere between the last two characterisations. I hope it will become obvious as I 
outline its defining features why I considerate the most appropriate perspective to take 
when discussing technological mediation in relation to craft practice. 
 
One of the key figures within the development of pragmatic philosophy was John Dewey 
and specific reference will be made to his brand of Instrumental Pragmatism. His work 
contributed most to the development of a theory which emphasised the central role which 
inquiry plays in the construction of meaning and truth. Through this interest in inquiry 
and activity Dewey developed a critique of tools and media. The concept of a ‘tool’ is 
used throughout much of Dewey’s instrumentalism to describe the function of both 
physical implements and theoretical concepts. Coyne summarises the breadth of function 
and definition of a tool in the statement:  
 
“The tool is part of the active productive skill brought to bear on a situation. The 
tools that feature in the reorganisation of the experience include theories, 
proposals, recommended methods and of course action. The applicability of the 
tool is worked out in the situation.” (Coyne 1995 p.39) 
 
A pragmatic perception of reality can be said to be based “...in what we do, what we use 
and what we think” (Coyne 1995, p.6). It opposes the rationalist tradition of philosophy 
which favours theory above practice. “For the pragmatist,...,theory is just another kind of 
practice.” (Coyne 1995, p.17) It is not superior to, or a precursor to, practice.  
 
Whereas rationalism and the conservative characterisation affirms the subservience of the 
technology to its content (i.e. technologies are simply a functional means of achieving 
something), pragmatism is orientated towards an active engagement with technologies 
and materials. It is concerned with what works and how technology fits into the practical 
day to day activities of people. Dewey, states:  
 
“There is no such thing as genuine knowledge and fruitful understanding except 
as the offspring of doing. Thinking and doing are inseparable, ... only by 
wrestling with the conditions of a problem at first hand, seeking and finding his 
own way out, does he think.” (Dewey 1916, p.275 ) 
 
It can also be recognised from this statement how the pragmatic consideration of the 
relationship between thinking and doing as inseparable opposes the hierarchical 
relationship which is set up by the conservative characterisation. 
 
The pragmatic characterisation is primarily concerned with the consideration of 
technologies as ‘extensions of man’, as tools with which to change a situation. Although 
these tools can be both mental or physical, the pragmatic perspective is often identified 
with the physical employment of tools and machines, and the consideration of man as 
homo faber (i.e. a tool-maker and tool-user). This focus on the study of tools has lead to a 
perception of pragmatism as reductionist. However, pragmatism’s consideration of the 
relationship between cause and effect is not the same as the conservative characterisation. 
 
The conservative characterisation encourages a consideration of ends (i.e. the results of 
employing a technology) to be fixed, goals to be defined and successes and failures to be 
judged on the achievement of these goals. The rationalist/conservative tradition seeks 
simple linear causative relationship between causes and effects. In contrast, pragmatism 
recognises the complexity of the means-ends relationship (i.e. cause and effect). Dewey 
developed the phrase ‘ends-in view’ to describe his concept of ends which are provisional 
and evolutionary. These ‘ends-in view’ can be considered as plans which guide an 
ongoing process (e.g. the making of an artefact). ‘Ends-in-view’ are dynamic and active 
throughout the process of an inquiry. They are never remote, (as an end as final outcome 
would be), but imminent through every stage in a process. Therefore ‘ends-in-view’ are 
continually under review, in a reflexive relationship with the processes (i.e. means) 
employed in an inquiry. As Hickman suggests in the description of producing a new work 
of art/craft; 
 
 “In the production of every successful artefact, which is to say in every stage of 
a successful inquiry, means and ends so interpenetrate that they can be sorted 
out only in retrospect. Every process of free art proves that the difference 
between means and ends is analytic, formal, not material and chronological.” 
(Hickman 1990. p.73) 
 
Dewey proposes the term ‘the continuum of ends-means’ to emphasis the continuity of 
ends that are also means, means which are not neutral but active and have associated 
values, causes which are also effects.  
For Dewey, the relationship between means and ends, (tools and intentions), is dynamic 
and reflexive, not uni-directional and straight forwardly causal. 
 
This re-evaluation of the relationship between means and ends also challenges the 
conservative notion of value free or neutral means (i.e. technologies). In the rationalist 
view the ends are somehow fixed in advance which enables the development of criteria 
by which they can be judged. Therefore the ends can be argued to justify the means. 
Dewey’s thesis in which means and ends are inextricably linked, does not allow this type 
of categorical statement to be made.  
 
“For means are not merely neutral ingredients of a plan: they have inherent 
values and disvalues...The choice of means, in short, enters into and qualifies 
the nature of the end.” (Scheffler 1974, pp. 230-231).  
 
The use of a particular means (i.e. a tool) will not only effect the material outcome of a 
process, but also influence the individual’s thinking It will have an impact on the way one 
experiences the world. To some degree this effect can be related to the concept of 
enframing discussed within the critical characterisation. 
 
Unlike conservatism and the Platonic tradition, being is not considered as an unknowable 
or essential concept (i.e. above and beyond the conditioning effects of the world). In the 
pragmatic view being is solidly grounded in the world of experiences, it is concerned 
with how we are in the world and ‘being in a situation’. Being is conditioned by our 
situation in the world, it is under continual change (i.e. we are constantly in a state of 
becoming). Therefore it is not a static or essential concept, but dynamic and conditional. 
Whereas the Platonic tradition is concerned with what stays the same in the face of 
change, pragmatism is concerned with things that change and how this occurs. 
 
Summary of characteristics 
To summarise the relevant pragmatic characterisations of technology: 
  
Technologies are regarded as tools or instruments which can be either physical or 
mental (i.e. they can be physical tools, like hammers and chisels, or mental tools, like 
theories and systems of working). 
 
 
 
 
 
The relationship between means and ends is not seen as linear and causative, but 
dynamic and reflexive (i.e. the end you originally may want to achieve is often changed 
or effected by the means by which you do it). Therefore the technology used becomes 
bound up with what is produced (i.e. what you use impacts on the nature of the final 
outcome when making something).  
 
Technologies are ‘extensions of man’ (sic), and therefore can be considered part of us 
and we of them. (E.g. a hammer becomes an extension of the hand, a telephone extends 
are ability to talk over distances greater than we can shout; a voice extension.) 
 
Because tools are considered as ‘extensions of man’, they have an impact on the users 
thinking and so change the user (or society). So as we change the world, we in turn are 
changed. Therefore this characterisation does not take a non-ethical, amoral stance to 
the employment of technologies. The use of technologies is bound up with our being and 
therefore must be integral to our ethical and moral decision making processes. 
 
Pragmatism recognises that employing a particular technology on the one hand extends 
your ability to do something, but on the other focuses and so restricts you. Particular 
tools invariably select, amplify  and reduce aspects of experience in various ways (E.g. a 
chisel extends your ability to carve wood, but it is a specialised tool and restricts your 
ability to pick things up.) 
 
Craft and Pragmatism 
If craft is considered as an activity in which the engagement with materials and processes 
plays a significant role in the creative development of work, and there is an integration of 
thinking and doing in the holistic activity of making, then connections between craft 
practice and pragmatism's inquiry centred philosophy begin to emerge. 
 
Just as craft practitioners recognise the essential role of practical investigation within 
their practices, Dewey considers doing to be the basis for all new knowledge. 
Furthermore, pragmatism's challenging of the hierarchical privileging of theory over 
practice can be aligned with the holistic nature of craft in which thinking and doing are 
integrated into the practice of 'intelligent making'. 
 
The concept of ends-in-view to describe the notion that results are rarely absolute and 
fixed in a process of enquiry compares closely to the process of 'designing through 
making'. This process is another important feature of craft practices and can be used to 
differentiate them from more industrialised forms of production.  
A crafts process can often be evolutionary and the final work being an expression of the 
making process, rather than the result of formally carrying out a fixed idea. 
 
At the basic level of defining creativity I would argue that the pragmatic perspective 
encourages a more dynamic and reflexive view of the creative process. The conservative 
characterisation along with the platonic and romantic traditions believe that creativity is a 
mysterious essential phenomenon which resides in the head of an individual (often a male 
genius). The creative individual is considered to stand outside society or the everyday 
world, to be an observer with a unique view of the world. There is a linear process from 
the mysterious inception of an original idea within the mind of the individual to its 
manifestation through materials, processes and technologies to completed work which 
embodies this original idea (see Fig 1.) 
  
Fig. 1 
 
In contrast the pragmatic notion of creativity is bound up in the world of activity and 
inquiry. Rather than a linear process in which the processes and technologies are passive 
conduits through which creativity flows, they are active elements within the dynamic 
creative process. This model of creativity involves a cyclical process in which the 
intentions of an individual (i.e. ends-in-view not fixed goals) are used a starting point in a 
process of creating something original. Through the interaction with materials, processes 
and technologies these initial intentions are modified and developed, and are then used to 
drive further activity until a final outcome is reached (see Fig. 2). Creative individuals are 
therefore not considered to stand apart form the world, but are caught up in it and 
creativity emerges through an interaction with it. 
 
Fig. 2 
 
The Use of Computer Technologies within Craft Practices. 
Finally I want to briefly look at the significance of makers employing computer 
technologies.  
 
From the critical perspective espoused by Heidegger and Fry the use of CAD/CAM 
technologies can be seen as an anathema to craft practice. Not only do these systems 
attempt to embody skills within themselves and so create 'dead labour'. But furthermore 
they enframe a users being into a mechanised and systematised mode of revealing which 
limits the possibility of more authentic poetic way of being. Through divorcing the hand 
from the direct manipulation of materials, the craftsperson literally loses touch with the 
world. From this perspective there is no role for such technologies within craft practice 
and their use should be actively discouraged. 
 
There are undoubtedly issues concerning the loss of direct manipulation of materials. The 
breaking of the continuous feedback loop provided by the sense of touch has been 
highlighted by Dormer (1997), Johnson (1997) and others as a challenge to one of the 
defining features of craft. For them the 'handmade' object embodies a particular type of 
knowledge born from direct personal engagement with materials which is unique to craft 
practices. Although Johnson argues that craft is an important means of sustaining the 
‘literacy of touch’, she recognises that 'touch' as a concept can be considered beyond 
immediate physical contact. She states: 
 
“...-by understanding more fully global touch, reach-touch and imagined touch, we 
may find a more fruitful way to locate and articulate crafts in relation to 
information technology. This relationship might not be an oppositional one, but 
more interdependent.” (Johnson 1997, p.298) 
 
I would also suggest that the experience gained by craftspeople is not all tacit and bound 
up with physical practice. Knowledge gained through practice can also be made explicit 
and used to guide the development of future work. Because this knowledge is not tacit it 
can be transferred from one type of technological mediation to another. Therefore some 
of the experience gained using 'traditional' technologies can be fruitfully employed to 
guide the use of digital technologies. This is not to argue that existing craft skills are 
being replaced by the use of digital technologies, but that too much emphasis can given to 
the role of tacit knowledge within craft practices and the role of other less embodied 
ways of knowing played down. 
 
Heidegger's concept of enframing is important in impact of modern technologies on their 
users. However, enframing as a dangerous restricter, which limits possibilities for 
original ‘revealing’ (e.g. being creative in the making of something original), I find more 
questionable. From the pragmatic perspective we affect tools, and tools affect us. Both 
physically and mentally they are transformative. This effect can be considered as a 
restriction. However, as McCullough (1996) and Ihde (1979) suggest, technologies can 
equally well be considered as a means of focusing. Focusing actively engenders a 
particular way of being-in-the-world, however I believe it can be empowering and 
liberating rather than necessarily restrictive. New methods of working instigate news 
ways of thinking and doing, which facilitates the production of original new works, 
which if successful, embody the new methods and technologies employed.  
 
 
 
 
Craftspeople tend not to use computer technologies to replace existing skills or mimic the 
nature of pre-existing modes of production, they are used to extend their practices in 
order to create works that where previously impossible or impracticable to make or even 
consider. (N.B. the use of these technologies changes the way you think about making as 
well as your physical practice, it is not just a case of using a technology to functionally 
provide a new means of doing something.)  
 
This approach to employing digital technologies may provide a way of making a 
distinction between industrialised production and craft which is not based on the degree 
to which objects are 'handmade'. In the context of industrial manufacturing, where 
CAD/CAM technologies where developed, Fry's argument about the creation of 'dead 
labour' through the embodiment of traditional skills into mechanised systems is more 
convincing. CAD/CAM technologies are developed and employed to increase efficiency 
and speed up product development times. Whereas craftspeople tend to extend their 
practices through using CAD/CAM technologies, industry often replaces engineering, 
modelling and moulding skills with CAD/CAM systems (although it must be noted that 
one set of 'traditional' skills can be replaced with a new set based on using digital 
technologies). Modes of production are rarely embodied within the industry's final 
products and technologies generally considered from the conservative perspective as a 
functional means to a predefined end, rather than means of engagement which opens up 
new creative potentials and  provides a unique way of being-in-the-world. 
 
Conclusion 
I hope to have shown the significance of the way in which we discuss technologies and 
the need to reflect on the terms we commonly employ when considering this field of 
activity.  
 
If we choose to regard technologies from the conservative perspective then we must 
accept a view which privileges theory over practice, which down grades practical forms 
of knowledge (e.g. craft knowledge). Furthermore it disregards the role which 
engagement with materials and technologies plays within the creative process. It 
encourages a functional consideration of technologies which gives no consideration to 
their role in framing the way in which we experience to world. 
 
If a Heideggerian critical perspective is taken then we must accept that technological 
mediation defines our very being and that it is intrinsic to how we are in the world. 
Furthermore, that modern technologies have become so pervasive that our being is 
defined by their ordering of the world in a particular way that restricts other less rigid and 
more poetic possibilities of being, and so the potential to create art/craft.  
Craft must be considered principally as way of being which defines itself in opposition to 
modern technological culture and forms of production. This restricts the professional 
craftsperson to a practice which must, to some degree, stand apart from the contemporary 
culture, rather than be integrated into it. This utopian concept of craft works well as an 
evening class antidote to the alienation of modern urban life. However, it is less helpful 
for the professional craftsperson working within modern culture and attempting to 
develop strategies for making a living. 
 
Taking the pragmatic perspective opens up more fruitful ways of thinking about 
technological engagement, craft, creativity and CAD/CAM. There is a recognition that 
mediating technologies have an impact on the way we perceive the world and that they 
are not ethically or functionally neutral. However, pragmatism does not make any 
significant distinctions between 'traditional' tools and modern technologies, they all both 
extend capabilities while also restricting and focusing them. Pragmatism's recognition 
that theory and practice are bound together in the process of gaining new knowledge 
through active inquiry (i.e. 'doing'), provides an argument for the worth of holistic 
activities such as craft. In addition the notion of creativity being grounded in engagement 
with materials and technologies (an active process) rather than a mysterious mental 
phenomenon provides a model in which the processes of doing are not merely the 
carrying out of predefined creative ideas, but play an essential role in the development of 
original new works.  
 
From this perspective the use of CAD/CAM within craft practices is not ruled out as a 
dangerous encroachment of technologies which will systematise traditional skills and 
enframe a user's being and so restrict the potential for the production of any form of 'true 
art'. However, neither does it regard CAD/CAM as just another way of making 
something, a functional means to an end. It is a perspective which encourages us to 
reflect on the way in which the technologies we employ change our perception of the 
world. There are significant issues surrounding CAD/CAM's use within practices where 
the concept of 'the handmade' is both economically and philosophically important. 
However, I would still maintain that such technologies in combination with more 
traditional tools and processes, can be used to extend the practices of craftspeople and 
facilitate new ways of thinking and doing and so create original new works. 
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 Techné is one the roots of the word technology. It was used to describe the implementation of practical 
skills with an element of reason (i.e. intelligent making). 
 Poiesis is the ancient Greek term for the poetic. However it needs to be understood as having a far broader 
usage than the poetic has today. “The term is utilised to refer to productive activities, whether those of the 
shipbuilder or the poet, was poiesis or techné.” (Hickman 1990 p.108) 
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